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Dynamically Maintaining Standards
using Incentives
Ramo´n Hermoso1 and Henrique Lopes Cardoso2
Abstract Standards have had much importance in different fields of re-
search in order to assure a certain quality of service in bilateral contracts.
More specifically, in multi-agent systems performance standards may be used
in order to articulate contracts among partners in environments dealing with
uncertainty. However, little effort has been made on how to ensure standards
compliance over time. In this work we put forward a learning-based mecha-
nism that attempts to maintain performance standards by applying incentives
and/or punishments to agents identified as specialised for certain tasks. We
present some empirical results supporting our approach.
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1 Introduction
A number of research proposals have been made recently concerning the de-
velopment of infrastructures for supporting interaction in open multi-agent
systems. In such systems agents enter and leave the interaction environment,
and behave in an autonomous and not necessarily cooperative manner, ex-
hibiting self-interested behaviours. Even when agents establish commitments
among them, the dynamic nature of the environment may jeopardize such
commitments if agents are not socially concerned enough, valuing more their
private goals when evaluating the new circumstances.
Moreover, in open systems one cannot assume that agents will behave
consistently along time. This may happen either because of agent’s ability or
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benevolence. In some cases, an agent may not be capable of maintaining a
certain behaviour standard throughout its lifetime. In other cases, the agent
may intentionally deviate from its previous performance. It is therefore im-
portant, when considering open environments, to take into account also the
evolution of an agent’s internal skills or motivations, besides the dynamics of
the interaction environment as a whole.
Looking at the society from a role-specialization perspective, Hermoso et
al. [3] propose a coordination mechanism, based on role evolution, that assists
agents in selecting good partners to whom to delegate specific tasks. The
authors look at the agent society and identify “run-time roles” that cluster
agents with similar skills for (sets of) tasks. This allows one to identify the
role that labels agents most suitable to perform a specific task.
Building on this work, in this paper we associate roles with performance
standards and address their maintenance: given the dynamics of agents’ be-
haviour, how can performance standards be guaranteed? Two different poli-
cies can be used when agents start under-performing. One is to update the
role taxonomy and to measure new standards. But assuming that this reor-
ganization may be costly, another option is to influence agents’ reasoning by
employing incentives, as an attempt to keep them on track.
In Section 2 we put forward a model to establish and adjust incentives in
order to maintain standards over time. We present some empirical results in
Section 3. Finally, we sum up the paper and point future work in Section 4.
2 Incentive-based mechanism to maintain standards
While the work in [3] focused on providing a role specialization taxonomy
enabling better trust estimations of agents when performing specific tasks,
in this paper we assume that such roles may be used to assess performance
standards that provide a clearer picture of agents’ skills. The path from roles
to standards is described in [4]. These measured standards are then to be
maintained through an incentive-based policy.
In order to devise an incentive mechanism, we model our interaction sce-
nario according to the well known principal-agent model [5, 1] from eco-
nomics, in which a principal (a service requester) requests an agent (the
provider) to perform a specific task. The principal is interested in influencing
the efforts that the agent puts when performing the task: efforts correspond
to available actions with different execution costs. The exact actions executed
by the agent are unobservable to the principal; instead, the latter observes
some performance measures. Actions determine stochastically the obtained
performance, which is therefore a random variable whose probability distribu-
tion depends on the actions taken by the agent. By establishing an incentive
schedule, the principal aims at encouraging the agent to choose actions better
leading to an intended performance standard.
Fig. 1 A standard as a target
2.1 Targeting standards
Standards are generated using an averaging function applied to task exe-
cution outcomes of a group of provider agents (as explained in [4]). Since,
according to our model, standards allow requesters to identify expected val-
ues for task executions, we consider a standard as a target that agents should
meet. Any deviation from the standard is seen as a sub-optimal outcome. Fig-
ure 1 illustrates this idea, where ς represents the expected target standard,
and each concentric circle labelled with δi denotes equidistant performances
to the target. These concentric lines highlight the fact that deviations in any
direction are considered equally harmful in terms of expected values. The
arrow pointing towards the centre discloses the aim of our incentive-based
approach: to encourage providers to better target the standard.
We assume each provider has a set of actions at its disposal, each with a
cost and a probability function for obtaining different performance outcomes.
As follows from Figure 1, an outcome is seen as a distance to the standard.
This allows us to think of actions as efforts the provider puts in when exe-
cuting a given task: the more effort is invested, the higher the likelihood that
the obtained outcome will be closer to the standard. Naturally, expending
more effort also means bearing a higher cost.
2.2 Actions, outcomes and incentives
More formally, using a finite model for actions and outcomes, we have that:
• The provider has an ordered set of possible actions A = {a1, ..., an}, where
ai ≺ aj if i < j. This means that Cost(ai) < Cost(aj).
• The possible observable outcomes the provider may obtain is an ordered
set X¯ = {x¯1, ..., x¯m}, where x¯i ≺ x¯j if i < j (x¯i is a worse performance than
x¯j). For simplification, we assume that x¯i ∈ [0, 1], for all i ∈ [1,m]: each
x¯i denotes the percentage of the target standard that has been achieved.
• There is a probability distribution function for X¯ given an action in A,
where p(x¯k|ai) is the probability of obtaining outcome x¯k ∈ X¯ when per-
forming action ai ∈ A. We have that
∑m
k=1 p(x¯k|ai) = 1, for all i ∈ [1, n].
We assume that the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) [1], re-
lating actions with outcomes, holds for every provider. MLRP states that
greater efforts are more likely to produce better outcomes: for any ai, aj ∈ A
with ai ≺ aj , the likelihood ratio p(x¯k|ai)/p(x¯k|aj) is non-increasing in k.
Incentives are specified through an incentive schedule function mapping
possible outcomes to values to be collected or paid by the provider: I : X¯ → I.
We take I to be non-decreasing, that is, I(x¯1) ≤ ... ≤ I(x¯m), meaning that
higher outcomes must have at least the same incentive as lower ones. More-
over, we look at incentives as producing some change in the utility the agent
would get if no incentives were in place; in this sense, I = {ι : ι ∈ [−1, 1]},
where positive (negative) values denote percentage increases (decreases) in
utility. When ι = 0 there is no incentive in place.
Based on the stochastic model of action outcomes explained above, each
provider is taken to be expected utility maximizer. Therefore, when choosing
the action to perform it will maximize expected utility [9]:
arg max
a∈A
Ea =
m∑
i=1
p(x¯i|a)u(I(x¯i))− Cost(a) (1)
where u(I(x¯i)) is the utility the agent gets from obtaining performance out-
come x¯i and consequently incentive I(x¯i). Function u : I → [0, 1] is taken to
be strictly increasing. We assume provider agents are risk averse. We define
function u using a sigmoid:
u(I(x¯)) =
1
1 + e−I(x¯)·B+κ
(2)
where κ ∈ R represents a parameter to tune the center of the sigmoid function
and B ∈ N+ allows us to tune the sensitivity to received incentives.
2.3 Deviations and responses
Given the previous performance of each provider, on which standards have
been defined, we identify two possible causes for agents to deviate from those
standards, in the sense that they are not able to meet them anymore. Such
causes naturally come to surface from analysing Equation 1: i) action costs
have changed, leading an agent to choose actions that stochastically obtain
lower outcomes; ii) probabilities for an action’s performance outcomes have
changed, e.g. due to environmental factors not under the control of the agent,
meaning that a specific action is not as effective as before.
These deviations in performance may make a role taxonomy and its pre-
viously measured performance standards inaccurate to represent agents’ cur-
rent capabilities. In order to maintain standards, the system may determine
and employ an appropriate incentive schedule I : X¯ → I, which is based on
measurable outcomes of task execution. As mentioned before, an outcome is
a percentage of the target standard that has been met. Unlike typical ap-
proaches in game theory, we do not assume any knowledge of the incentive
policy maker regarding action costs and probability distributions over out-
comes, or provider utility functions. Thus, we see the problem of searching for
an optimal incentive schedule as a reinforcement learning (RL) [8] problem.
In the following we briefly describe how states, actions and rewards are
addressed in the problem faced by the incentive policy maker.
States. The state entails recently obtained performance outcomes. States
exhibiting performances farther away from the target standard need to be
addressed with stronger incentive policies, while states denoting abidance to
agreed standards need no intervention from the policy maker.
Depending on how performance quality is to be interpreted, we may ag-
gregate recent task executions in different ways. In this paper we rely on an
average: perf =
(∑t
i=t−∆ x¯
i
)
/∆, where t is the current time step, x¯i is the
outcome obtained at time step i and ∆ is the size of the time window, i.e.
the number of task executions to consider.
In order to reduce the size of the state space, states are discretized accord-
ing to the number of levels of deviation that are to be addressed differently,
as illustrated in Figure 1. We define a δ parameter specifying in how many
intervals to split the distance to target standards:
state =
{
1 if perf = 1
bperf · δc /(δ − 1) if perf < 1
This function gives us δ different states, represented by values within [0, 1].
Actions. Available learner actions concern incentive schedules I that spec-
ify, for any x¯ ∈ X¯ , an incentive value ι ∈ I. Following [1], each action can be
seen as a non-decreasing incentive vector (ι1, ..., ιm), where m is the number
of possible outcomes. In order to reduce the action space, we consider only
incentive values in the set bI · 10c /10 (discrete values with 0.1 steps). Yet,
depending on the number of outcomes to consider, this may still give us a
huge number of actions to experiment with.
The heuristic we use to tackle with this problem is to explore the action
space by generating incentive schedules that consist of minor changes to the
currently employed schedule: we step-change one of the incentive values and if
needed fix the rest of the schedule to guarantee the non-decreasing property.
A softmax policy [8] is used to select among the actions considered.
Rewards. An optimal incentive schedule should take into account both
the obtained provider outcomes and the cost of applying the incentive sched-
ule. In our approach, these costs are associated with the actual performances
that such a schedule has led to, since incentives are paid (if positive) or
collected (if negative) according to actual outcomes. Considering that the
mechanism does not seek profit, but rather to intervene as least as possible,
we sum the absolute values of actually applied incentives when computing
the incentive schedule cost.
A reward is computed as a weighted difference between the sum of obtained
outcomes and the cost of the incentive schedule. Using weights allows us to
define the relative importance of providers’ performance and incentive cost.
In RL, Q(s, a) values are computed to determine the expected return for
executing action a in state s. We update these values using the simple update
rule Q(s, a) = Q(s, a)+α·(reward−Q(s, a)), where α is a step-size parameter
(we use α = 0.3 for the following experimental evaluation).
3 Experiments
We have implemented a simulation environment by using the Repast frame-
work. In order to calculate actual outcomes when a task is requested,
providers’ behaviour is defined in terms of possible outcomes. In order to
do that, we need to set a relationship between efforts and actual outcomes.
We have modelled this issue by using beta distributions. There exists a dif-
ferent beta distribution for every different possible effort, in order to be
able to calculate actual outcomes. We consider as possible outcomes the set
x¯1, x¯2, . . . , x¯7, where x¯i are different equidistant values in [0, 1]. For the sake
of simplicity, the number of different efforts available to providers is the same
(although it needs not be): a1, a2, . . . , a7. We set the centre value for each
effort as the outcome value with the same index: each effort ai will obtain an
outcome modelled as a beta distribution centred in x¯i. In the experiments
reported in this paper, all providers share the same beta distributions.
We also need to define a function for effort costs. These costs are used in
the provider’s decision making (see Equation 1). For that purpose, we use
Equation 3 to define different profiles of providers. This means that different
providers may have different costs for the same efforts.
Cost(a) = α · (ρ+ (1− ρ) · a1/β) (3)
In this set of experiments we have a heterogeneous population of 100
providers, with random values for α, β and ρ, thus obtaining individuals
with a different curve relating efforts to their costs. We set values κ and B
to 0 and 10, respectively (see Equation 2). Those values fix the sensibility of
providers to incentives in their decision-making processes.
We simulate task requests from customers, one to every different provider
in every time step. We show average results from 10 different runs.
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Fig. 2 Experimental results
In Figure 2(a) we observe how our approach progressively learns an appro-
priate incentive schedule, which induces providers to behave better: they get
progressively closer to the standard. We can also see that this process takes
some time, since there exist a high number of possible new (unexplored)
incentive schedules that can be generated in each step of the learning pro-
cess. Once the approach converges to an (almost) optimal achievement of the
standard, an appropriate incentive schedule makes providers select the most
reliable action (in terms of standard achievement).
Figure 2(b) shows the evolution of the incentive schedule employed. Incen-
tives applied to each possible outcome are shown.
4 Conclusions and future work
Standards are used as a means to articulate contracts in social interactions.
In this paper we have proposed a mechanism that provides incentives to
make agents maintain a level of performance as close as possible to the stan-
dards. Some possible applications of this approach cover from manufacturing
systems, in which agents playing different roles when building a craft are sup-
posed to meet and maintain a standard during their work, to social systems
such as ruled electronic markets, where while standards may not be known a
priori, they can be discovered at runtime and artificially maintained for the
sake of the overall market community.
There are economic approaches also founded on the emergence of stan-
dards. Sherstyuk [7] proposes a method to set appropriate performance stan-
dards to develop optimal contracts, in which the provider’s best choice is to
keep the standard through its action. In this paper, however, we are not pur-
suing optimal performance standards; instead, we are concerned about how
to maintain the level of those standards once they have been created.
In the same line Centeno et al. [2] present an approach on adaptive sanc-
tion learning by exploring and identifying individuals’ inherent preferences
without explicit disclose of information – the mechanism learns over which
attributes of the system should modifications be applied in order to induce
agents to avoid undesired actions. In our case, we adhere to a more formal
scenario, in which interactions are regulated by means of contracts. Moreover,
we assume that the attributes that may be modified by means of incentives
are already known by the mechanism.
The approach taken in [6] also assumes that the mechanism knows which
attributes it should tweak in order to influence agents’ behaviors, namely
by adjusting deterrence sanctions applicable to contractual obligations that
agents have committed to. The notion of social control employed there is
similar to our notion of role standard maintenance; however, instead of a
run-time discovered standard, a fixed threshold is used to guide the decisions
of the policy maker. Moreover, only sanctions (seen as fines) are used to
discourage agents from misbehaving, while here we are also interested in
incentivating agents to do their best (by using appropriate actions) while
executing the tasks they are assigned to.
We intend to pursue the mechanism presented in this paper, namely by
refining the learning model of the incentive policy maker. We also intend
to combine the approach with the decision on when to reconfigure the role
taxonomy from which standards have been generated.
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